Introduction
Discussion on concepts both in philosophy and psychology have produced so many new ideas on the topic, that it becomes difficult to make any comparison between contemporary debates and the Fregean worries. After recent criticism of concepts as natural kinds (Frixione 2007 , Macherie 2009 ) cognitive scientists, philosophers and psychologists are proposing new ways of treating different aspects of cognition in humans and other animals; are concepts developed from a prelinguistic ability to classify? How do they develop in children? If we do not define concepts as natural kinds, shall we define them as functional kinds? shall we define them epistemically, semantically o by their origin? (see for instance Sainsbury-Tye 2011). Although some Fregean "problems" are still confronted, the contemporary debate on concepts seems to go far away from the original terminology used by Frege, that attracts mainly exegetic confrontation (we have excellent examples in Künne 2010 and Textor 2011) . A possibility to find new suggestions in Frege's analysis of concepts may take two trends: on the one hand we may work on how his complex distinction of "levels" of concepts present psychologists and computer scientists with new problems (cf. Brandom 2009); on the other hand we may work on the history of ideas 1 and When Woodward and Bernstein published details of the Watergate scandal in The Washington Post, they called their source "Deep Throat". Upon learning of the leak, Richard Nixon surmised that Deep Throat was a traitor from within his administration. However, Nixon did not suspect that his Deputy Director of the FBI, Mark Felt, was the traitor. In fact, Nixon sent Felt a bottle of champagne several years later when he was pardoned by Ronald Reagan for authorizing illegal searches of the homes of members of the Weather Underground. Obviously, Nixon would never have intentionally done the same for Deep Throat. But Nixon didn't know that Mark Felt was Deep Throat, and neither did the public until 2005, eleven years after Nixon passed away. Explaining Nixon's propositional attitudes requires an appeal to modes of presentation, which stand in a many-to-one relation to their referents. Deep Throat was Mark Felt, but Nixon had two modes of presentation of him. That's why Nixon was able to rationally believe both that Deep Throat is a traitor and that Mark Felt is not a traitor. This much I take to be fairly uncontroversial. The nature of these modes of presentation, however, is more contentious.
The traditional view traces to Frege (1892; 1918) and is systematically developed by such thinkers as Dummett (1981) , Evans (1982) , Peacocke (1992), and Burge (2005) . It identifies modes of presentation with senses, abstract semantic entities that serve as the constituents of the contents of propositional attitudes, which Frege calls "thoughts" (Gedanken). Because thoughts are composed from senses, and the senses Mark Felt and Deep Throat are distinct, the thoughts Mark Felt is a traitor and Deep Throat is a traitor are also distinct. It was thus In philosophy, concepts are often roughly regarded as the constituents of mental contents. In Davidson's opinion, the model of triangulation, which is a situation where two (or more) sufficiently similar interacting creatures respond to one another within a shared external environment, can give explanation to how concepts and mental contents are acquired and also clarify their very nature. In section one, I will start by exploring the model of triangulation, its various levels, and its specific role in concept acquisition. Then, in section two, I will assess the plausibility and the efficacy of Davidson's account and summarise some of its problems; those related not only to the very notion of triangulation but also to the prerequisites of thought that he identifies. In section three, I will suggest a few possible amendments to the model of triangulation, in order to make it effective in explaining the processes of concept acquisition. Finally, in section four, I will argue that the model of triangulation cannot be disconnected from holism and briefly sketch some consequences of this claim in regard to concepts.
Triangulation and Concept Acquisition
Davidson describes triangulation as 'a triangle, one apex of which is oneself, another a creature similar to oneself, and the third an object […] David Chalmers and Frank Jackson have prominently defended a strong program of conceptual analysis that accords the armchair analysis of concepts without the use of empirical knowledge a central philosophical role (Chalmers 1996 , Jackson 1994 , 1998 . In the case of the empirical concept of consciousness, they have even argued that a priori philosophical analysis shows that consciousness cannot be scientifically reduced to any material features (Chalmers 1996, Chalmers and Jackson 2001) . They have based this on an account of concepts and concept possession using two-dimensional semantics (Chalmers 2002a , 2002b , 2004 , 2006 , Jackson 1998 . This essay criticizes Chalmers and Jackson's account of concepts, but my criticism also holds for other proponents of two-dimensional semantics (e.g., Haas-Spohn and Spohn 2001), in particular David Braddon-Mitchell (2004 , 2005a , 2005b , who does not make bold claims about a reductive explanation of consciousness but attempts to apply 2D semantics to scientific concepts and their historical change. My contention is first that 2D semantics is metaphysically flawed as an account of what it is to possess an empirical concept. 2D semantics makes faulty assumptions about how concept possession relates to the ability to imagine possible scenarios; and by erroneously assuming that concept possession is an a priori ability,
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Many authors have held that language is necessary for thought: without language, there are no concepts. This language-first thesis is typically associated with German romantics, but it is by no means exclusive of them. Many philosophers of the analytic tradition have endorsed it, and it has even been claimed that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was inspired less by the romantics than by early analytic philosophers (Joseph 1996) .
However, the hypothesis that language somehow shapes thought, or our conceptual structure, does not require a thesis as strong as the language-first 
Concepts and Minds
Let us suppose I say to Ulysse: "I will show you a skyscraper" and I show him the Reliance Building. He tells me "No, that is not a skyscraper. It is shabby, and plus it is only fourteen storeys high". He is obviously thinking of the imperial monsters of Michigan Avenue.
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One might say, in some sense, that Hector, who confronts Achilles and so is heading for a certain death, is an example of courage. One might say, in some (other?) sense, that Andromache who accepts his leaving and suffers it, keeping her strength to protect their son, is another. Now, a friend of instantiation would say that, in Hector, there is an abstract particular (a particular moral property by the way) that is an instance of courage, and that, in Andromache there is another abstract particular that is another instance of courage. Of course, the abstract particular that makes Hector courageous 1. The topic of my discussion is the relation between concepts and perceptual experience, and, more specifically, the way concepts must be conceived to be involved in perceptual experience if we are to have satisfactory account of the relationship between thought and the world we think about. The main question I shall explore is whether the contents of experience are best conceived as propositional in form, or whether a conception on which experiential contents are non-propositional, yet still concept-involving, is to be preferred. John McDowell used to advocate a propositional conception, but has changed his view; I will orient my discussion in significant measure around this change and some of the grounds McDowell gives for having made it. After some stage setting, I explicate McDowell's new view, and then ask whether it can sustain the claim
Against Classical Concepts
In the cognitive science literature, sometimes one happens to read that concepts are "the most fundamental constructs in theories of mind" (Laurence and Margolis, 1999, p. 3), or that they are "the glue that holds our mental world together" (Murphy, 2002, p. 1) . However, in spite of similar enthusiastic claims, a unitary notion of concept did not emerge, and there are good reasons to suspect that, from the standpoint of an empirical science of the mind, the notion of concept could turn out to be spurious: as we shall see, the idea that within the mind a collection of more or less homogenous structures exists, corresponding to our common-sense notion of "concept" is likely to be wrong.
The research on concepts has been sometimes considered to be a successful example of the interdisciplinary approach of cognitive science. However, when we try to single out which results have been achieved, we realise that the main (perhaps the only) ascertained fact is the inadequacy of the so called "classical theory" of concepts. The central claim of the classical theory is that
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In this article, I explore how cognitive neuroscience bears on philosophical debates about concepts. First, I lay the groundwork for my discussion by examining which debates about concepts are most likely to benefit from contact with cognitive neuroscience, broadly construed as the use of brain data to test hypotheses about human cognition. I propose that debates about the nature and acquisition of conceptual knowledge-e.g. debates about whether certain concepts are innate-are most amenable to data from cognitive neuroscience. I also introduce two of the tools by which cognitive neuroscientists study conceptual knowledge-functional neuroimaging studies and neuropsychology studies-and illustrate some important findings to date (section 2). Then (sections 3-5) I evaluate three debates about the nature and organization of conceptual knowledge: whether concepts are amodal or perceptual representations, whether the brain contains a unitary "semantic" or "conceptual" system, At the core of Descartes's system of philosophy lies his tripartite theory of distinctions. Substances are individuated by the famous real distinction. The modal distinction obtains between a mode of a substance and another mode of the same substance or between two modes of the same substance. The conceptual distinction or rational distinction (distinctio rationis) is the most subtle and, I think, of paramount importance for Descartes.
1 This article illustrates that importance by showing how the rational distinction illuminates some difficult problems in Descartes's theory of substance.
Descartes's characterization of rational distinction is unfortunately terse, so our first task is to make it clear enough to be a serviceable too. We can then proceed to use it to articulate the concept of substance. Descartes's official statement of his understanding of rational distinction in the Principles at Part I, article 62:
Finally, a conceptual distinction is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single substance. (VIIIA 30; 1 214) 2 1 In this article, the terms 'rational distinction' and 'distinction of reason' will be used, but 'conceptual distinction,' Cottingham's translation, is quite justifiable insofar as it constitutes an important part of Descartes's theory of conception. 2 Descartes's writings are cited first by the volume and page numbers of Adam and Tannery (1964-86) followed by the volume and page number of the translation in Cottingham, et al. (1984-91 Hume is notoriously difficult to pin down on fundamental questions, and this is specially the case of his position with regard to external objects or bodies in the Treatise. Although he insists that "nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas …" (T 1.2.6.7) 1 , throughout the Treatise Hume appeals to bodies and external objects as such. In her influential paper, "The Objects of Hume's Treatise," Marjorie Grene painstakingly documents the different senses of 'objects,' and she convincingly argues that 'object' as external existence dominates the Treatise (Grene 1994). Despite Hume's firm commitment to the thesis that the only objects that can be present to the mind are perceptions, the objects most present in the Treatise do not seem to be perceptions.
Interpretations vary widely. Some argue that perceptions are only the immediate objects of the mind, that Hume's "approach to the external world is inside-out" (D. Norton 2004). Others maintain that Hume, like Berkeley, whose self-proclaimed idealism does not prevent him from speaking with the vulgar about quads and trees, merely engages in the facile discourse of the common man, endorsing only the existence of perceptions. For Hume, external objects or bodies are nothing but collections of perceptions. Others find greater significance in Hume's vulgar attitude; Hume appears to be not just speaking, but also thinking with the vulgar. These interpreters draw a distinction
One of the most striking views held by Thomas Reid was his rejection of what I'll call the Orthodox Theory of Conception. The Orthodox Theory of Conception (OTC) maintains that what it is to conceive of X is to possess an idea of X (or, perhaps, to have the idea of X present to the understanding in the right way). Reid's explicit discussions of why he rejects OTC suggest dual motivations: First, Reid claims an inability to understand what these ideas are actually supposed to be, and views them as unfounded theoretical postulates (which he abhors). Second, Reid believes that accepting OTC leads us down a path to radical skepticism (which he also abhors).
1 Reid's proposal, instead, is that © ProtoSociology Volume 30/2013: Concepts -Contemporary and Historical Perspectives certainly doesn't seem that experience itself is in language.
7 But this is too quick. Things do not wear their logical forms on their sleeves. Propositional form, even linguistic propositional form, needs not look like writing or sound like speech. Braille may not look like language (except to one who can understand it), but it is. And think here also of the Tratatus: P. 1: "The world is all that is the case." P. 1.1 "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." Facts are propositional, so on a Tractarian view of the world, we must say either that the world is linguistic, or that not all propositions are linguistic. And you can no more refute the Tractarian picture by pointing at the world and saying, "See? Not propositional!" than you can refute idealism by kicking a stone.
8 Moreover McDowell does assert, in Mind and World, that it is a Tractarian world, composed of facts, and continues to hold that view. 9 He also believes that we have the world itself in view in experience. In any event, it is a simple-minded phenomenology that would deny propositionality to experience so quickly, and not one McDowell would accept.
But the phenomenological worries for propositionalism are not over. Part of the impetus for distinguishing experiential from propositional content is the richness of experiential content. What is implicit in it is always more than what is made explicit in any discursive judgments one might make on its basis. There is already more together in the content of an intuition than one can carve out and put together with other contents in a judgment. In Dretske's terms, we might say that intuitional content is analog, while discursive, propositional content-like the content of a belief based on intuited content-is digital. But this is neutral between propositional and non-propositional accounts of the content of experience. First, note that McDowell explicitly rejected the idea to truth values. 7 Moreover, one might worry that, if experience is propositional, then, given the connection between propositionality and language, only language users could have experience. Whatever its merit, this worry has no place in the dispute between the propositional and McDowell's intuitional views of experiential content. McDowell agrees with the Sellars of EPM that only linguistic beings have experience, at least of the sort relevant to human cognition. What we enjoy is not brute animal sensibility with something more added, but rather something that is at best generically of the same sort, but specifically different. 8 Spinoza, in defense of his thesis that the will and the intellect are one and the same, insists that ideas are essentially affirmations or negations. To repeat my epigraph, "those who think that ideas consist of images … look on ideas … as mute pictures on a panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation." Ethics II, P49SII. McDowell's view of experiential contents as concept involving certainly aligns experience with thinkings, as ideas and not mere images. But to Spinoza, this suffices to make experiences affirmations or denials, which can only be propositional. 9 Private communication (August 13, 2013).
I. Introduction
William of Ockham's (ca. 1287-1347) theory of concepts of beings seems to be open to objections raised by Geach against "abstractionist" accounts of concept acquisition (Geach 1957, 18-44) , where abstraction is understood as the process of "singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience-abstracting it-and ignoring the other features simultaneously given-abstracting from them." (ibd., 18). It might indeed be difficult to flesh out Ockham's sketchy account of the process of concept acquisition of (kind of ) things in a way that is not open to various objections. According to him, there is a kind of singular cognition, namely intuitive cognition. To be more exact, intuitive cognition is a kind of non-propositional intellectual cognition of particular things that are present to the subject.
1 Intuitive cognition plays a central role for Ockham's account of concepts of beings: a subject can acquire a concept of (a kind of ) things on the basis of intuition of a particular thing by some process of abstraction.
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The theoretically interesting point is that Ockham does not attempt to explain recognitional abilities in terms of the possession of concepts such as cat
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We read in [Nick Huggett, 2010] that little is known about the original writings of Zeno of Elea, but his paradoxes became famous because people like Simplicius found ways of eternizing them.
The paradox we deal with here is interesting to us because it connects directly to Mathematics (like The Sorites). The Dichotomy, which is considered a paradox of motion, is about describing the world objects through the real numbers.
Even though there seems to be clarity in a common person's mind regarding the extraordinary differences between the machine world (Logic) and the exclusively human world (whatever does not fit in there), there seems to be some degree of difficulty in understanding this difference in a researcher's mind, as incredible as it may seem.
It seems that if one starts to worry too much about abstract things, then one loses touch with the concrete world. It is also possible that those who learn the scientific truths love to have the entire world, with all that there is in it, fitting inside of them in order to feel as if they are God and can control all.
The Sorites is about human beings believing that the human language is, or should be, something mechanical, not exclusively human at least sometimes. It is perhaps founded in the nonacceptance of the human freedom, which not just sometimes leads to confusion in people's understanding of others. Knowing other human beings is not an easy task. The effort to get to know a single other human being to the level that one knows oneself is so huge that it is very likely that only human beings who are faithful and loyal to their sexual partner,
Amongst the various paradoxes that bedevil the development assistance (DA) business Kowalski (2010; 2012b) drew attention to what he named the Epigenic Paradox. This paper seeks to elucidate that paradox and the various issues that relate to it.
In addition to those considerations surrounding the moral hazard of receiving aid there is also a corresponding hazard for the giver. When the helper has an interest in finding opportunities to be helpful it can generate imprudent behaviour leading to increases in the number of cases necessitating assistance, a manifestation of Say's Law applied to development assistance, where: "the presence of the offer of aid then creates a new scenario where the problematic situations are partly incentivized by the aid offer. The order of causality is reversed."
